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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

]

Plaintiff/Appellee,
VS.
| CASE NO. 920100-CA
]I PRIORITY NO.

FRANK P. WENTZ,
Defendant/Appellant.

;

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
The Jurisdiction of the Utah Court of Appeals is conferred
pursuant to U.C.A. , section 78-2a-3(2)(d).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
The Appellant assigns the following errors, on the part of
the trial court, and issues as grounds for his appeal in this
case:
A.

Did agents from the Utah Department of Public

Safety have statutory authority to operate in the State of
Wyoming.
B.

Was the conduct, on the part of the agents from the

Utah Department of Public Safety, violative of Appellant's 4th
and 14th Amendment rights under the Constitution of the United
States.

1

C.

Was the conduct, on the part of the agents from the

Utah Department of Public Safety, violative of Appellant's rights
under Article I, section 14 of the Constitution of the State of
Utah.
D.

Was the conduct, on the part of the agents from the

Utah Department of Public Safety, violative of Appellant's rights
under Article I, section 8 of the United States Constitution.
E.

Was the conduct, on the part of the agents from the

Utah Department of Public Safety, violative of Appellant's rights
under Article IV, section 2 of the United States Constitution.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a ruling, in the Third Judicial
Circuit Court, Summit County, Judge Edward A. Watson, denying
Appellant's Motion to Suppress and Appellant's bench trial
conviction for 1) Possession of a Controlled Substance, a
violation of U.C.A., section 58-37-8(2)(a)(i), and 2) Unlawful
Importation of Alcohol, a violation of U.C.A., section 32-7-30.
On or about May 24, 1991 the Appellant went from the State
of Utah to Evanston, Wyoming with a friend. Appellant was the
driver of the vehicle. After arriving in Evanston, Wyoming
Appellant went to Porter's, a liquor store in Evanston, Wyoming,
and purchased a quantity of beer. After purchasing the beer, the
Appellant and his companion went to JB's restaurant in Evanston,
Wyoming and remained there in excess of one hour for the purpose
of eating. (R, pg. 93, In. 22 - pg. 94, In. 25)
2

On or about May 24, 1991 Agent Brad Blair, an Agent of the
Utah Department of Public Safety, and several other Agents of the
Wtafa Department of Public Safety

f

on their own initiative, took

Utah State vehicles from the State of Utah and proceeded to the
parking lot of Porter's Liquor store in Evanston, Wyoming. (R,
pg. 93, In. 2-14; pg. 96, In. 19 - pg. 97, In.17)

The agents

parked in the parking lot of Porter's Liquor store and waited to
observe vehicles with Utah license plates.
At some point in time the agents observed the Appellant's
vehicle pull into the parking lot of Porter's liquor store,
observed Appellant's Utah license plates, monitored Appellant's
activities, witnessed the Appellant purchase a quantity of
alcohol from Porter's, followed Appellant through the streets of
Evanston, Wyoming, waited outside of JB's Restaurant in Evanston,
Wyoming while the Appellant ate his meal, followed Appellant on
his way out of Evanston, Wyoming and after Appellant was
approximately 1/4 of a mile across the Utah State line stopped
and searched the Appellant's vehicle. (R, pg. 93, In. 22 - pg.
95, In. 7) As a result of the stop and subsequent search, a
quantity of alcohol was seized from the Appellant's vehicle and
he was issued a citation for unlawful importation of alcohol.
Pursuant to the stop, the agents observed a "dope pipe" in
the hand of a passenger of the vehicle, both Appellant and the
passenger were given their miranda rights, both Appellant and the
passenger were asked if there was any marijuana on their person
or in the vehicle, and both individuals directed the agents to
3

marijuana. (R, pg. 104, In. 7, - pg. 106, In. 20). Appellant was
then arrested and further charged with possession of a controlled
substance.
Appellant was charged with

1) Possession of a

Controlled Substance, a violation of U.C.A., section 58-378(2)(a)(i), and 2) Unlawful Importation of Alcohol, a violation
of U.C.A., section 32-7-30. (R, pg. 12-13) A jury trial was
originally held in the Summit County Justice Court and Appellant
was convicted on both charges. Appellant appealed his Justice
Court jury trial conviction to the Third Circuit Court, Coalville
Department, and a Trial De Novo was held. Appellant filed a
motion to suppress in the Circuit Court.

In the Circuit Court, a

hearing on Appellant's motion to suppress the evidence was heard
at the same time that the bench trial was conducted. The Circuit
Court judge denied the Appellant's Motion to Suppress and found
the Appellant guilty of both counts of the Information.
(R, pg. 82, In. 1 - pg. 86, In. 21)
Appellant now appeals.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
A.

Did agents from the Utah Department of Public

Safety have statutory authority to operate in the State of
Wyoming.
B.

Did the activities of the agents from the Utah

Department of Public Safety, in the State of Wyoming, constitute
an illegal search and seizure.
4

C.

Was the conduct, on the part of the agents from the

CTtah Department of Public Safety, violative of Appellant's:
- 4th and 14th Amendment rights under the
Constitution of the United States
- Rights under Article I, section 14 of the
Constitution of the State of Utah
- Rights under Article I, section 8 of the United
States Constitution
- Rights under and Article IV, section 2 of the
United States Constitution

ARGUMENTS

POINT I
DID THE AGENTS FROM THE UTAH DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC
SAFETY HAVE AUTHORITY TO OPERATE IN THE STATE OF
WYOMING

It is clear from the trial record that the agents in this
case, from the Utah Department of Public Safety, exist as a
result of the legislature's enactment of U.C.A., section 32A-15101. (R, pg. 92, In. 23-24; pg. 96, In. 19 thru pg. 97, In. 19;
pg. 102, In. 22 thru pg. 103, In. 2; pg. 109, In. 20 thru pg.
Ill, In. 6)

As such, the agents in this case, from the Utah

Department of Public Safety, "have general law enforcement
jurisdiction throughout the state." (U.C.A., section 32A-155

102(2).

Thus, under U.C.A., section 32A-15-102(2) the agents in

this case, from the Utah Department of Public Safety, have
statutory to operate only within the boundaries of the State of
Utah.
This being the case, the question becomes: Is there any
statutory authority extending these agents jurisdiction beyond
the borders of the State of Utah?
Another possible source of these agents' authority could
stem from U.C.A., section 41-13-7, however, these agents do not
fit under any of the categories enumerated.
Another possible source of these agents7 authority could
stem from U.C.A., section 32A-15-106, however, all references in
this code section are to powers within the State of Utah.
Another possible source of these agents7 authority could
stem from U.C.A., section 77-9-3. However, a close look at
U.C.A., section 77-9-3, coupled with the facts of this case,
reveals that the activities of the agents in this case, from the
Utah Department of Public Safety, do not fall within any of the
provisions of U.C.A., section 77-9-3.
In the absence of the state presenting evidence to the
contrary, it appears clear that:
1.

The agents in this case, from the Utah Department

of Public Safety, are governed by U.C.A., section 32A-15-101,
and;
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2.

The agents in this case, from the Utah Department

of Public Safety, have general law enforcement jurisdiction
throughout the state pursuant to U.C.A., section 32A-15-102(2).
3.

The agents in this case, from the Utah Department

of Public Safety, have no authority to operate independently
outside the boundaries of the State of Utah.

POINT II
DID THE ACTIVITIES OF THE AGENTS FROM THE UTAH
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY CONSTITUTE
CONSTITUTIONALLY PROHIBITED ACTS

Appellant relies on the case of State v. Fixel, 744 P2d 1366
(Utah, 1987). The factual analysis of the officer's activities in
the Fixel case hold true to the present case, to wit: that the
law enforcement agents were acting outside the scope of their
statutory authority when conducting their surveillance in the
State of Wyoming.
As o^ir Supreme Court pointed out, however, in Fixel (Supra,
at 1368 t 1369), such activities in and of themselves do not
require suppression of the evidence.
"'Only a 'fundamental7 violation of [a rule of criminal
procedure] requires automatic suppression, and a violation is
'fundamental7 only where it, in effect, renders the search
unconstitutional under traditional fourth amendment standards.
Where the alleged violation ... is not 7fundamental7 suppression
7

is required only where: (1) there was 'prejudice' in the sense
that the search might not have occurred or would not have been so
abrasive if the [r]ule had been followed, or (2) there is
evidence of intentional and deliberate disregard of a provision
of the [r]ule.... It is only where the violation also implicates
fundamental, constitutional concerns, is conducted in bad-faith
or has substantially prejudiced the defendant that exclusion may
be an appropriate remedy.

Fixel (Supra, at 1368, 1369)

It is Appellant's contention herein that, in the instant
case, the conduct of the agents from the Utah Department of
Public Safety was so outrageous that due process principles would
absolutely bar the government from invoking judicial process to
obtain a conviction. [SEE United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423,
431-32, 93 S.Ct. 1637, 1643, 36 L.Ed.2d 366 (1973)]
The basis for this contention is as follows:
1.

Governmental Entrapment occurred: government

conduct entrapment occurs where governmental participation is so
outrageous or fundamentally unfair as to deprive the defendant of
due process or as to move the courts to exercise their
supervisory jurisdiction over the administration of criminal
justice. [SEE United States v. Killough, 607 F.Supp. 1009, 1011
(D.Ark. 1985)]

It is fundamentally wrong for law enforcement

agents from the State of Utah to randomly spy on residents from
the State of Utah outside the boundaries of the State of Utah
where the individuals are not the subject of a specific criminal
investigation stemming from activities within the State of Utah.
8

2.

The activities of the agents, in this case,

from the Utah Department of Public Safety, constituted an
unreasonable search under Article I, section 14 of the Utah
Constitution and the 4th and 14th Amendments of the Constitution
of the United States: It is fundamentally violative, of Article
I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution and the 4th and 14th
Amendments of the Constitution of the United States, to condone
law enforcement agents from the State of Utah to randomly spy on
residents from the State of Utah outside the boundaries of the
State of Utah where the individuals, who are the subjects of such
police activities, are not the focus of a specific criminal
investigation stemming from activities within the State of Utah.
Utah residents have an expectation of privacy in their travel to
other states and in their lawful activities in other states
without "big brother" watching. Such ad hoc monitoring of
residents of Utah outside the boundaries of Utah by Utah law
enforcement officials without legal authority constitutes an
illegal search in violation of the foregoing constitutional
provisions.
Further, Appellant contends that the activities engaged in
by the agents, from the Utah Department of Public Safety,
violated Appellant's due process rights afforded by the 14th
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. "Due process
of law is a summarized constitutional guarantee of respect for
those personal immunities which, as Mr. Justice Cardozo twice
wrote for the Court, are so rooted in the traditions and
9

conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental." Rochin
v. People of California, 72 S.Ct. 205, 208(1952)

The conduct

engaged in by the agents from the Utah Department of Public
Safety, is conduct which "...more than offends some fastidious
squeamishness or private sentimentality about combatting crime
too energetically. It is conduct that shocks the conscience."
Rochin (Supra, pg. 209)
3.

The activities of the agents, in this case,

from the Utah Department of Public Safety, constituted a
violation of Article I, section 8 of the United States
Constitution: The presence of Utah law enforcement officials, in
the State of Wyoming, without authority, constituted an attempt
on the part of Utah to regulate commerce among the several
states. This is an area which is specifically reserved, by
Article I, section 8 of the United States Constitution, for the
appropriate governmental branches of the Unites States government
and is neither a legitimate state function nor a justifiable
state purpose.
4.

The activities of the agents, in this case,

from the Utah Department of Public Safety, constituted a
violation of Article IV, section 2 of the United States
Constitution: The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all
Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.
Appellant alleges that these privileges and immunities include
the right to travel between Utah and other states and conduct
lawful activities outside the boundaries of Utah without
10

government interference and without the government engaging in
conduct which places a "chilling effect" upon such legal
activities.
Appellant contends that, based upon these four grounds,
either a "fundamental violation," has occurred, to wit: activity
which renders the search unconstitutional under traditional
fourth amendment standards, and thus exclusion/suppression of the
evidence is required or, in the alternative, a "non-fundamental"
violation has occurred, to wit: the activities implicate
fundamental, constitutional concerns, are conducted in bad-faith
or the activities have substantially prejudiced the defendant,
and therefore exclusion/suppression of the evidence is an
appropriate remedy. State v. Larocco, 794 P2d 460, 471 (Utah,
1990)

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing grounds, and based upon the foregoing
arguments, it appears that the agents from the Utah Department of
Public Safety engaged in unauthorized conduct beyond the borders
of the State of Utah. Their conduct was offensive,
constitutionally violative, and shocking to the senses. The
conduct should be punished by invoking the exclusionary rule,
further, due to the taint of their unlawful and constitutionally
violative conduct, the defendant's arrest should be held
unconstitutional.
As such, Appellant requests that this Court:
11

1.

Reverse the Appellant's convictions;

2.

Grant such other and further relief as this court deems

appropriate.
Dated this 19th day of June, 1992.
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32A-15-101. Creation of Bureau of Narcotics
and Alcoholic Beverage Law Enforce*
ment
There is created within the Department of Public
Safety the Bureau of Narcotics and Alcoholic Beverage Law Enforcement.
mo
32A-15-102. Responsibility and jurisdiction.
The bureau shall:
(1) have specific responsibility for the enforcement of all laws of the state pertaining to alcoholic beverages and products;
(2) have general law enforcement jurisdiction
throughout the state;
(3) have concurrent law enforcement jurisdiction with all local law enforcement agencies and
their officers. The bureau does not relieve local
law enforcement agencies or officers of the responsibility of enforcing laws relating to alcoholic beverages and products or any other laws;
(4) sponsor or supervise programs or projects
related to prevention, detection, and control of
violations of Title 32A, the Alcoholic Beverage
Control Act, and the Utah Controlled Substance
Act; and
(5) respond to the call of the governor for
emergency or other purposes as the governor
may require.
mo

13A

32A-15-102. Responsibility and jurisdiction.
The bureati shall:
(1) have specific responsibility for the enforcement of all laws of the state pertaining to alcoholic beverages and products;
(2) have general law enforcement jurisdiction
throughout the state;
(3) have concurrent law enforcement jurisdiction with all local law enforcement agencies and
their officers. The bureau does not relieve local
law enforcement agencies or officers of the responsibility of enforcing laws relating to alcoholic beverages and products or any other laws;
(4) sponsor br supervise programs or projects
related to prevention, detection, and control of
violations of Title 32A, the Alcoholic Beverage
Control Act, and the Utah Controlled Substance
Act; and
(5) respond to the call of the governor for
emergency or other purposes as the governor
may require.
1990
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32A-15406. Director and officers to have peace
officer powers.
(1) The director of the bureau and each enforcement officer
(a) is vested with the powers of peace officers
throughout the several counties of the state, with
the exception of the power to serve civil process;
(b) has the powers and duties of inspectors under Title 32A, the Alcoholic Beverage Control
Act;
(c) may serve criminal process and arrest and
prosecute violators of any law of this state; and
(d) have the same rights as other peace officers
to require aid in executing their duties.
(2) The powers and duties conferred upon the director and the officers of the bureau are not a limitation
upon the powers and duties of other peace officers in
the state.
iwo
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41-13-7. Allocation of duties.
In general, the allocation of duties of the Department of Public Safety shall be as follows:
(1) Commissioner's office.
(2) Division of Utah Highway Patrol.
(3) Division of Drivers' License and Accident
Records.
(4) Division of Safety Education and Promotion.
(5) Division of Safety and Financial Responsibility.
(6) Division of the State Fire Marshal.
1985
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77-9-3. Authority of peace officer of this state
beyond normal jurisdiction.
(1) Any peace officer duly authorized by any governmental entity of this state may exercise a peace
officer's authority beyond the limits of such officer's
normal jurisdiction as follows:
(a) When in fresh pursuit of stn offender for the
purpose of arresting and holding that person in
custody or returning the suspect to the jurisdiction where the offense was committed;
(b) When a public offense is committed in such
officer's presence;
(c) When participating in an investigation of
criminal activity which originated in such officer's normal jurisdiction in cooperation with the
local authority;
(d) When called to assist peace officers of another jurisdiction.
(2) Any peace officer, prior to taking such authorized action, shall notify and receive approval of the
local law enforcement authority, or if such prior contact is not reasonably possible, notify the local law
enforcement authority as soon as reasonably possible.
Unless specifically requested to aid a police officer of
another jurisdiction or otherwise as provided for by
law, no legal responsibility for a police officer's action
outside his normal jurisdiction and as provided herein, shall attach to the local law enforcement authority.
1980
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